Author
Denis Mancevič, PhD
Instead, here, I’ll focus on the main losers of this election, as I see them. (Spoiler alert: this doesn’t include the Democrats led by Harris—that much is obvious. Nor does it include “American democracy,” as unlike the Democratic camp, I believe it has already survived plenty and will likely survive another Trump term as well. Perhaps painfully, but the patient won’t die.) So, about the losers.
The first and most obvious loser will be Ukraine. Even if or when Trump “succeeds” in bringing peace to Ukraine, it will not be the kind of peace most of the Western world would wish for—fair and long-lasting. Instead, it will be a peace in disguise, a camouflaged capitulation of Ukraine as a result of (the likely) end of American military aid. Without this support, Kyiv cannot maintain the current front lines, let alone launch any counteroffensive. Therefore, we will likely see negotiations start soon (in a few months?), with Russia setting the pace and terms. And by now, we know the vast ambitions of Kremlin imperialism. Such a Ukrainian capitulation would be, above all, a severe blow and loss for Ukraine, its people, and its future—and a major headache for the EU.
The EU will be the second loser, not only due to the new headache in the form of Russian imperialistic ambitions after Kyiv’s fall, but also because this headache, brought by shifting transatlantic relationship dynamics, will turn into a migraine. The EU is already losing the competitiveness battle with the U.S. (and China), and now, as Trump 2.0 accelerates the gears of protectionist U.S. trade policies, the competitive gap will only widen. In light of this, the EU will finally have to realize that its long-term success depends not only on political slogans like “together we are stronger” but on its ability to play a significantly more independent role from the U.S. in various areas … primarily in defense (which again means more funding), technology, development, and finance. The EU has had time for such a step since at least 2016, when Trump first entered the White House, but unfortunately, that opportunity has been missed. Nothing was done—or even worse, much was done, but mostly in the wrong direction. Just take a look at a few pages of Draghi’s report for confirmation.
If we turn to our side of the Atlantic, Trump’s return might also be a harbinger of a problem already present, though the established left-wing politics fails (or refuses) to recognize it. In the U.S., it wasn’t Trump who won; rather, the Democrats suffered a significant loss. They had no real answers to the populism, vulgarity, xenophobia, and fascism that dominate the daily discourse of the “first Slovenian son-in-law.” Biden had no answer, and Harris even less so. This bitter realization is also waiting for the Slovenian left, which, in the past decade, has easily won only with the “anti-Janša” reflex—without a solid program, groundwork, or political craftsmanship. They will need to show more. The average voter has a short memory; we see this both in the U.S. and here at home. While the migraine stage of competitiveness may have already begun for Europe, it’s not entirely too late for the Slovenian left, but time is running short. This is not about slogans like “unity” or “togetherness” but about a more ambitious and clearly defined program, credibility, and respected politicians, along with effective, crowd-engaging communication. Without this, even a continuous rotation of new faces will soon lose its effectiveness. Harris is a clear example.
If we look at this side of the Atlantic, Trump’s return might also signal a problem that is already here, though the established left-wing politics fails (or is unable) to recognize it. In the U.S., it wasn’t Trump who won, but the Democrats who suffered a major loss. They had no real answers to populism, vulgarity, xenophobia, and fascism… the daily rhetoric of the “first Slovenian son-in-law.”